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SOME POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS*

"The Constitution," Peter Berger has observed, "might
well have set up a wall of separation between church and state,
but it most certainly did not set up a wall between religion and
politics."' Nevertheless, the desirability of a secularized politics has assumed a prominent place in the pantheon of constitutional truths about church-state relations. "The idea is widely
accepted," writes Richard Neuhaus,
that religion is something between an individual and his
God. Each person is free to worship the god of her
choice. Religion is the business of church and home and
has no place in public space. Legally and politically, [this
axiom is] supported by a notion of the "separation of
church and state" that is understood to mean the separation of religion and religiously based morality from the
public realm. 2
This conventional wisdom significantly, if subtly, shapes
American views on church-state relations. Because privatized
religion and secularized politics are thought necessary for religious freedom and social and political stability, religious incursions into politics are uncritically assumed to present great
social and political dangers.' Threats originating from the
exclusion of religion from politics are less often recognized.
Thus, discussions of the appropriate role of religion in the
political realm proceed on the implicit assumption that the status quo of secularized politics, while perhaps oppressive to
believers, is nonetheless, "safe" (or, at least, "safer" than any
alternative).
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law;
Associate Professor, Mercer University School of Law. I wish to thank Ted
Blumoff, Roger Hendrix, andJack Sammons for their review of earlier drafts
of this paper. I also am indebted to the students who discussed these issues
with me in my Law and Religion seminar at Mercer last spring. Larry Stewart
provided his usual excellent research assistance.
1. Berger, Religion in Post-ProtestantAmerica, 81 COMMENTARY, May 1986,
at 41-42.
2. R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 20 (2d ed. 1986).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 17, 24-25.
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This necessarily imposes a heavy burden of persuasion on
those who would risk the admission of the distinctive voice of
religion into political dialogue. Discussions of church and state
illustrate the "correspondence theory of truth," whereby a
proposition is deemed erroneous solely because it does not
conform to unquestioned and unquestionable assumptions
about "external reality." '4 With respect to religion and politics,
this means that if a proposition is not consistent with the conventional wisdom of separationism, then for that reason it must
be false.
I want to challenge those who, intentionally or not, work to
maintain the assumption that the ruling constitutional metaphor of church-state relations-the "wall of separation"-is
properly applied to the American polity. A secular politics is
profoundly alienating to many religious people. By describing
a person as "religious," I mean that religion assumes a central
role in ordering that person's priorities and choices in life.
Studies suggest that at least one-quarter, and perhaps as many
as one-half, of all Americans are religious in this sense.5 The
potential consequences of alienating such a large portion of the
polity suggest what is often overlooked: While the unification
of church and state threatens individual freedom and social sta4. M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY
8-9 (1985).
5. For example, polls indicate that 58% to 61% of Americans believe
that religion can solve all or most of today's problems, 57% have high levels
of confidence in organized religion, and 55% to 56% state that religion is
"very important" in their lives. G. GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC
OPINION 1986 6, 9, 10, 15, 127, 272-73, 280 (1987); G. GALLUP, JR., THE
GALLUP POLL 1985 120-21, 162, 291 (1986). Another study found that 49%
of Americans can identify a specific time in their adult lives when they made a
"personal commitment to Christ" which changed their lives, and that 73% of
Americans frequently feel that God loves them, 57% frequently engage in
prayer, 44% frequently attend religious services, 28% frequently read the
Bible, 25% frequently participate in church socials, 23% frequently
encourage others to be religious, 21% frequently listen to religious
broadcasts, and 26% frequently engage in or experience at least five of these
activities and feelings. THE CONNECTICUT MUTUAL LIFE REPORT ON AMERICAN
VALUES IN THE '80's: THE IMPACT OF BELIEF 42, 43 (1981). According to one
report:
Perhaps the most appropriate word to use to describe the religious
character of the nation as a whole over the last half century is
"stability." Basic religious beliefs, and even religious practice, differ
relatively little from the levels recorded 50 years ago. In fact, the
nation has in some respects remained remarkably orthodox-even
fundamentalist-in its beliefs.
Gallup, 50 Years of Gallup Surveys on Religion, in THE GALLUP REPORT, May
1985, at 5.

1990]

SOME POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

bility, the separation of religion from politics threatens this
freedom and stability as well. Whether we choose to eliminate
the source of this alienation or simply to endure its consequences has important implications for the relationship
between religion and government.
I.
Before I proceed to the substance of my argument, I wish
to clarify a definitional point and a factual premise. I emphasize that the religious participation in politics that I will argue
for envisions religion in politics qua religion, and not qua interest
group. Any person or group who convincingly demonstrates an
ability to deliver large numbers of votes in an election will be
listened to by political representatives. Churches and other
religious groups have enjoyed considerable success in pursuit
of their agenda through contemporary interest group politics.
In this respect, however, they differ little from the hundreds of
organizations which seek to shape state and federal legislation
in ways that will benefit themselves.
By contrast, religion enters political dialogue as religion,
and not as an interest group, when it seeks to provide a point of
moral reference to public policy debates. One thinks here of
the anti-slavery activism of northern Protestant abolitionists in
the pre-Civil War era, or the anti-abortion activism of the
Roman Catholic Church in contemporary politics. Religious
groups do not enter these debates to protect an economic
interest; rather, they seek to witness against a moral wrong by
testifying to transcendent truth. The Catholic hierarchy
opposes abortion because it believes abortion flouts a divine
truth about the sanctity of life, and not because it undermines
an "interest" of the church. However successful churches and
other religious groups may be in gaining legislative recognition
of their parochial concerns, their attempts to enter political dialogue as moral referents generally have not been welcomed.
As to the factual point, my substantive argument rests on
the premise that there is in the United States a strong cultural
assumption that religion should be private, and politics should
be secular. Though the existence of this assumption may be
"widely accepted," in Reverend Neuhaus's words, its accuracy
is not always conceded, as the responses to this paper amply
illustrate. Whether this characterization of what American
public culture expects of religion and public life is fair and
accurate, then, bears some examination.
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The two-sided assumption of religious privatization and
public secularization is cultural in the broadest sense; thus, the
depth and extent of its influence are not always clear. One
might observe that there are relatively few obvious instances in
which religion has been affirmatively excluded from public life,
though attempts to achieve this result are not uncommon.6
The truth of that statement depends on what counts as "obvious" or "exclusionary." For example, the Supreme Court's
expansive interpretation of the establishment clause has led to
the exclusion of religion from public schools, even as a subject
of academic study or voluntary extracurricular activity.7 To
those who are committed to a secular public culture, this is
unremarkable. Indeed, it may not even be seen by such persons as an exclusion of religion from public life at all, because
that would presuppose that religion can properly claim to
belong in the public schools in the first place, which they would
deny.8 To many religious parents and students, however, the
Court's commitment to public school secularism seems both
obvious and unfair. Accordingly, whether one is persuaded
that there exists a cultural assumption that religion should
remain private and public life should remain secular is likely to
6. Consider, for example, the litigation pursued by the Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc. to revoke the tax exempt status of the National Conference
of Catholic Bishops and the United States Catholic Conference on the theory
that their pro-life activism constitutes partisan political activity. Abortion
Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aft'd sub
nom. In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1987),
rev'd sub nom. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.
v. Regan, 603 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub nom. In re Baker, 788
F.2d 3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Baker v. Abortion Rights Mobilization,
Inc., 479 U.S. 852 (1986); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 552 F.
Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544
F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See also McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630,
690-723 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
7. While this may not have been what the Court intended, it is in fact
how lower courts and public school officials generally have read the cases.
Compare School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224, 225 (1963) (religion is
an acceptable subject of academic study in public schools) (dictum) with
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984)
(voluntary extra-curricular prayer group in public high school violates
establishment clause), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986) and P.
VITZ, RELIGION AND TRADITIONAL VALUES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS:

AN

EMPIRICAL STUDY 21-22, 70 (1985) (showing that American public school
textbooks omit most references to religion). See also Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
8. See Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary American
Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 381.
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depend on how she perceives the status quo of church-state
relations.
There are many who believe that the status quo confirms
the existence of this cultural assumption. Rex Lee has noted
the common belief that religion does not belong in law school
classrooms. 9 More recently, Roger Cramton has bemoaned the
absence of values-based teaching in legal education, and suggested that moral dialogue about the law be renewed in law
schools by studying religious traditions.' 0 Commenting on
Dean Cramton's essay, Peter Shane has suggested that the law
school culture of values-skepticism criticized by Cramton is
symptomatic of American public culture in general.'" Stephen
Carter has argued that the Court's insistence on secularized
public education evidences a deep liberal hostility to any religious activity that is not confined to private life.' 2 And Gerard
Bradley has analyzed the Supreme Court's religion clause decisions as having constitutionalized a "privatization" theory of
religion. 3
In the specific context of politics, there are equally strong
and widespread perceptions that American political culture
seeks to exclude religion.' 4 Carl Esbeck has included strict
separationists in his typology of attitudes on church-state relations, describing them as those who believe that "civic issues
and affairs of state are to be debated and resolved in a wholly
9. Lee, The Role of the Religious Law School, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1175 (1985).
See also K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 5
(1988) (noting the "pervasively secular" environment of the legal academy).

This may partially be attributable to the continued vitality of skepticism
among legal academics, notwithstanding its general rejection by
philosophers. See M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS & LAW 10, 211 n.10 (1988).
10. Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37J. LEGAL EDUC. 509 (1987).
11. Shane, Prophets and Provocateurs, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 529 (1987).
12. Carter, Evolution, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987

DUKE L.J. 977.
13.

Bradley, Dogmatomachy-A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause

Cases, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 275 (1986).
14. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 9, at 5 ("a basic premise of common
legal argument is that any reference to [a transcendent religious] perspective
is out of bounds"); id. at 44 ("In part because they want to convince

nonbelievers and in part because they have a vague sense that such
arguments may be more acceptable in our political order, believers often cast
public arguments for their positions in nonreligious language."); e.g., Fish,
Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997, 999 ("[T]he liberal feels obliged
to quarantine religious pronouncements, to confine them to contexts (the

home, the Church) that present the least risk of general infection. He cannot
allow them to enter into the general political conversation because he does

not regard them, and could not regard them, as issuing from a respectable
point of view ....").
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Education, law, economics or military

defense are declared to be secular and are to be publicly
debated in such terms."' 5 Noting American liberalism's "longstanding and deeply felt attraction to strict separationist theories" of church-state relations, Mark Tushnet has suggested
that strict separationism and liberalism are theoretically quite
congenial, since the liberal tradition effectively excludes religion from public life by treating individual preferences as
beyond the purview of political analysis. 6 Professor Carter has
gone so far as to argue that liberalism simply cannot accommodate religious voices in political dialogue and hope to survive,
let alone remain theoretically coherent. 17
Evidence of the cultural assumption of religious privatization and public secularization is easy to find. A recent study
showed that national media reporters tend to "filter" religion
out of their political reporting, 8 a phenomenon that Reverend
Neuhaus personally observed in his experience as an aide to
Martin Luther King during the civil rights era.' 9 Many academ20
ics have flatly stated that religion has no place in law-making.
Kent Greenawalt has argued that the politics envisioned by
Bruce Ackerman and John Rawls necessitate the exclusion of
religion as a distinctive voice in the polity. 2 ' Professor Carter
has made the same argument about the work of Mark Yudof
and David Richards. 2 Though he strongly argues that both
15. Esbeck, supra note 8, at 381.
16. M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 272 & n.99 (1988).
17. Carter, supra note 12, at 987-92.
18. P. BENSON & D. WILLIAMS, RELIGION ON CAPITAL HILL: MYTHS AND
REALITIES 5, 72-84 (1986).
19. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 98 (describing how the television
cameras always turned off when Dr. King began speaking about the religious
justifications for racial equality).
20. See, e.g., D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 190-91 (1984); G.
WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 229 (1966); Henkin,

Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 411
(1963); Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77J. PHIL. 515, 538-40
(1980).
21. GREENAWALT, supra note 9, at 51-56 (discussingJ. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1971) and B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980)). See also Carter, supra note 12, at 986-87 (making same argument
about Ackerman); Rorty, Taking Philosophy Seriously (Book Review), NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 11, 1988 at 31, 33 (making similar observation about Rawls).
Professor Ackerman, at least, appears to agree with this characterization of
his work. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 99 (1984);

Ackerman, Remarks at the Meeting of Section on Law and Religion, AALS
Annual Meeting (Jan. 6, 1989).
22. Carter, supra note 12, at 986-92 (discussing D. RICHARDS,
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citizens and government officials should be able to rely on their
personal religious convictions when making political decisions,
Professor Greenawalt himself nevertheless insists that political
discourse in a liberal democracy cannot include arguments
from religious premises.2 3
The Supreme Court itself has supplied plenty of grist for
this mill. The Court periodically warns us-though always in
dicta-about the unique dangers posed by religious activism in
the political realm. 24 Indeed, religious involvement in government has occasionally evoked dark analogies to the inquisitorial
25
persecution of medieval and post-Reformation Europe.
This deep suspicion of religion is implicit in many
Supreme Court opinions. The Court has only equivocally
endorsed religious participation in politics. 26 Religion for
TOLERATION

AND

THE

CONSTITUTION

GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW,
AMERICA (1983)).
23. K. GREENAWALT, supra note 9,

(1986)
AND

and

M.

GOVERNMENT

YUDOF,

WHEN
IN

EXPRESSION

ch. 12.
24. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 416 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252-53 (1982) (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.)); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 442-43
(1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). It is true, as Oliver Thomas has pointed
out, Comments on Papers by Milner Ball and Frederick Gedicks, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 451 (1990), that many of these opinions speak of the
danger in the context of government funding. Nevertheless, the Justices do
not generally warn about political divisiveness stemming from appropriations
fights in non-religious contexts, which suggests that they see something
uniquely dangerous about religiously motivated politics.
25. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968) (Black,
J., dissenting); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-27 & 431-33 nn. 7-8 (1962);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947).
26. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). In McDaniel, the
Court held unconstitutional a state statute which prohibited ministers from
serving in the legislature. In contrast to Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion, which analyzed the statute as an unconstitutional religious test for
political office, id. at 642-43, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion for
himself and three other Justices found that since the statute regulated
conduct rather than belief, the state might justify the prohibition of ministers
in the legislature by showing a compelling state interest, though he found
that the state had not done so in this case. Id. at 626-29. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1202-04 (2d ed. 1988). In a similar vein,
commentators have occasionally suggested that political control of a public
forum or governmental body by members of the same religion might justify
government regulation of the participation of the religion and its members in
the political process. See, e.g., Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 884-88
(1984); Note, The Supreme Court, Effect Inquiry, and Aid to ParochialEducation, 37
STAN. L. REV. 219, 224-25 & n.33 (1984). Other religion clause decisions
attest that the compelling state interest test gives an individual less protection
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some of the Justices is a private and dangerous matter that
should be kept out of public space. 27 In establishment clause
cases, for example, the Court conclusively presumes that public
school students, because of their immaturity and lack of sophistication, are highly vulnerable to religious coercion. Yet, in
abortion contexts, the assumptions about sophistication and
maturity run in a different direction: Pregnant teenagers are
generally presumed by the Court to be sufficiently sophisticated and mature to be able to make the complex decision
about whether to undergo an abortion alone. 28 The missing
piece to this puzzling contradiction is the supposition that reli29
gion is singularly threatening to children.
It can be argued that the assumption of religious privatization and public secularization emanates only from a relatively
small number of social groups-public educators, judges, intellectuals, national media representatives-that even combined
are numerically insignificant. This understates the cultural
influence that these groups exert in the United States. These
groups are all disproportionately influential in the formation,
shaping, and maintenance of American public opinion. They
contribute mightily to the cultural backdrop that informs the
individual attitudes and decisions of each citizen. If it is true
that these groups, consciously or unconsciously, act on an
assumption that religion should be excluded from politics and
public life generally, then one should not be surprised to find
under the free exercise clause than under, for example, the equal protection
clause, where application of the test hardly ever results in justification of
infringements on individual rights. See generally Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict
Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CONST. COMM. 147 (1987).
27. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625 (Douglas, J., concurring); Everson,

330 U.S. at 52 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 51-52 (1985); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (Brennan,J.,
concurring and dissenting). But see Walz, 397 U.S. at 670.
28. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976). See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983) (upholding parental consent statute because it provided an alternate
means for child to obtain consent); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981)
(upholding parental notification statute against "as applied" attack because
child was unemancipated and made no claim or showing of maturity).
29. Gedicks & Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts
on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1613-14
(1987). For an extended analysis of this point, see Comment, Autonomous
Adolescents, Sexual Responsibility,, Religious Organizations, and Congress: An Illicit
Church/State Relationship?, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 425

(1988).

1990]

SOME POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

this assumption replicated in various ways throughout American life.
Whether an assumption of religious privatization and public secularization undergirds American public culture ultimately is a question for social scientists. It is enough for my
purposes that a belief in the truth of the assumption is plausible
and widely held. It is, after all, a commonplace in post-modern
thought that commitment to a particular conception of the
world renders the conception "real" to the believer regardless
of whether the conception can be said to have any objective
or independent existence." I take it to be true, then, that
many Americans have the well-founded belief that religion is
excluded from their political and public lives.
II.
My substantive argument begins with the nature of religious belief. I wish to make two points in this regard. First,
religion is experienced by the believer as holistic. Second, religion also is experienced as compelling for the believer, on both
the conscious and unconscious level. Both of these attributes
of religious experience are in serious tension with the assumptions of privatized religion and secularized politics.
A.
In primitive cultures, people depended on certain natural
processes and phenomena to sustain individual and communal
life. Climatic conditions which made it possible to grow or capture food are a good example. An existence so completely
dependent on nature is a perilous one, subject to being arbitrarily snuffed out. Vividly aware of the precariousness of their
lives, primitives embedded nature in religious myth so as to
confront, explain and subdue what was, in truth, uncontrollable."' Thus, the religious beliefs of primitive cultures generally
were integrated into and inseparable from every aspect of existence. "For religious man," wrote Mircea Eliade, "nature is
30. If one believes that in fact there is no cultural assumption of
privatization and secularization, notwithstanding widespread belief in one,
then a strategy for dealing with misplaced belief in the assumption is to
demonstrate empirically that the assumption is false, in the hope that the
mistaken belief will then correct itself.
31. Priest, Avth and Dream in Hebrew Scripture, in M'rrHs, DREAMS, AND
RELIGION 49-51 J. Campbell ed. 1970).
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The whole of life is capable of being

sanctified." 32
Though humanity no longer sees itself as existing at the
mercy of nature, its survival in the face of ubiquitous nuclear,
technological, and environmental crises seems always in doubt.
With respect to these and other modern existential crises, contemporary religion performs much the same task for moderns
that it performed for primitives: It infuses temporal existence
with meaning, and thereby helps one to deal with the precariousness of that existence. In the midst of the bewilderment
and confusion of modern life, religion suggests to people a
firmer, more stable reality free of the relative uncertainty of
subjective experience.3 3 Secure in the knowledge of what is,
and was, and will be, 31 the religious person feels able to distinguish reality from illusion, truth from deception. Because
sacrality unveils the deepest structure of the world, to paraphrase Eliade, the polarity between the sacred and the profane
actually is an opposition between the real and the unreal.3 5
The religious person feels able to confront and defeat the
threats to her existence inherent in modern life, because she
knows that this existence is not a complete reality. The religious person is able to withstand the apparent randomness,
precariousness, and vacuity of modern life because she knows,
or thinks she knows, its sacred, hidden meaning.3 6 Conversely,
removal of the sacred meaning that religion gives to the
believer's world leaves her lost and confused by removing the
most important referent by which she evaluates herself and her
32.

M.

ELIADE,

THE

SACRED AND

THE

PROFANE:

THE

NATURE

OF

RELIGION 151, 167 (1959). See also id. at 14, 117-19, 148-50, 183.
33. Id. at 28; Bradley, supra note 13, at 277.

34.

Cf. DOCTRINE

AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF

LATrER-DAY SAINTS [The Mormon Church] sec. 93:24 (1981) ("And truth is
knowledge of things as they are, and as they were, and as they are to come.").
35. M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at 12-13.
36. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 9, at 30-31 ("Like most major
religions, Judaism and Christianity ... try to make sense of the natural and
social world, to offer a 'deep understanding' of the place of human beings,
and to provide guidance about the 'most worthwhile way to live.").
Greenawalt also notes:
[A thoughtful] person [who] accepts a religion . . . will have a deep
sense that the religious perspective conforms with his own personal
experience and his understanding of social experience. If one has
not grown up within a tradition, the religion must have an initial
appeal that "speaks to his condition." If he accepts the religion,
there must be a continuing sense that it illuminates life's possibilities
and meaning.
Id. at 73.
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world.3 7 It is by revealing the sacred in objects and events that
religion and religious belief seek to uncover what is most real
about human existence."'
B.
Religion is consciously experienced by the believer as an
inescapable reality. Moveover, religion may exert just as compelling an influence on human behavior at the level of the
unconscious.
1.

The search for meaning in existence, the "will-to-meaning," is one of the strongest motivational drives of human
life. 9 This is particularly true for the religious believer. Only
in the context of the sacred does the religious person have
authentic being.4" Without that context, her place in the cosmos vanishes. Robert Bellah writes that "myth does not
attempt to describe reality ....

Myth seeks rather to transfig-

ure reality so that it provides moral and spiritual meaning to
individuals or societies."41 Men and women are drawn to religion because it purports to explain temporal life. Religion is
deeply attractive because of its affirmation of being and its
promise of salvation from the existential void. Thus, though in
one sense people choose their beliefs, in another sense their
beliefs choose them. Once a person acknowledges a significant
place for religious belief in her life, the content of that belief
challenges her, pulling her to conform her life-her whole lifeto its demands.4 2 Paul Tillich wrote that religion "points to
that which is ultimate, infinite, unconditional in man's spiritual
life. Religion, in the 43largest and most basic sense of the word,
is ultimate concern."

37. See id. at 180. See also M. PERRY, supra note 9, at 27-28 (discussing
moral relativism).
38. M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at 11, 28, 96-97.
39. V. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 154 (1959); accordJung, The
SpiritualProblem of Modern Man, in THE PORTABLE JUNG 471 (J. Campbell ed.
1976).
40. M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at 168, 178.
41.

R.

BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT:

AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN

3 (1975). See also J. CAMPBELL, THE POWER OF MYTH 53 (B.
Flowers ed. 1988).
42. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 250.
43. P. TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 7 (R. Kimball ed. 1959). See also
id. at 182.
TIME OF TRIAL
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A religious believer's inability to live her life consistent
with her ultimate concern-her deepest and most compelling
reality-puts in question the meaning of her life, and undermines her very existence.
2.
Carl Jung postulated that the human psyche is composed
of a "collective unconscious" as well as a personal one. Just as
the human body is the result of millions of years of evolution,
so also is the brain. "Our mind has a history," suggestedJung,
just as our body has its history. Our unconscious mind,
like our body, is a storehouse of relics and memories of
the past. A study of the structure of the unconscious collective mind would reveal the same discoveries as you
make in comparative anatomy.4 4
The collective unconscious is inherited, just like the general
characteristics of the body: 45 "As the body has its basic conformity,":said Jung, "so has the mind its basic conformity. "46
Whereas the personal unconscious reveals individual
psychic patterns, the collective unconscious reveals a psychic
pattern common to all humans. 47 These common patterns
Jung labelled "archetypes." They are the manifestation of general psychic forms that assert themselves in similar ways
regardless of cultural or personal context.4 8 Jung sometimes
referred to
them as the unconscious images of biological
49
instincts.

Jung maintained throughout his life that the existence of
the collective unconscious could be verified empirically, by analyzing the dreams, visions and other irruptions of the unconscious into the conscious, after controlling for personal and
cultural variations. After excluding all motifs that might possibly be known to a dreamer, any remaining motifs that function
consistently across individuals and cultures are manifestations
44.

C. JUNG, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY:

ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE 44,

45 (1968).
45. Id. at 60.
46. Id. at 46. See also E. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 23 (2d ed.
1963) ("we retain . . . the semantic assumption that the mind is a 'thing'
separate from the body").
47. C. JUNG, supra note 44, at 40.
48.

Jung, The Concept of the Collective Unconscious, in THE PORTABLE JUNG,

supra note 39, at 60.
49. Id. at 61. See alsoJ. CAMPBELL, supra note 41, at 37-51; E. ERICKSON,
supra note 46, at 107-08.
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of the collective unconscious-the archetypes. 50 Although the
idea of the collective unconscious remains controversial, it has
been highly influential, particularly among non-Freudians who
interpret manifestations of the unconscious as reservoirs of
personal meaning rather than pathological evidence of neurosis. One prominent American mythologist has gone so far as to
proclaim that the "truth" of the existence of the collective
unconscious is "beyond question" in the literature of
psychology. 5 '
It is important to understand that an archetype is not an
unconscious idea; indeed, it is not defined by reference to its
content. 5 2 An archetype is infused with definition and content
only after it manifests itself in the conscious mind and is filled
up with cultural ballast.5 3 Dreams, for example, are not archetypes, but merely their image.5 4 An archetype is form that
attracts substance, but is not itself substance; it invites meaning-is not itself intrinsically meaningful. One might call the
archetypes "psychological imperatives."
For example, the concept of the "second birth" is an
archetypal image that is found in virtually every culture in the
world.5 5 It reassures "that death is not final, that it is always
followed by new birth." 5 6 The archetype is the universal
human fear of non-existence; by contrast, its cultural image
may take many forms, such as the Christian resurrection or5the
7
belief in reincarnation common to many Eastern religions.
50. See C. JUNG, supra note 44, at 44; see also Jung, The Relations Between
the Ego and the Unconscious, inTHE PORTABLE JUNG, supra note 39, at 69-83.
51. Campbell, Mythological Themes in Creative Literature andArt, in MYTHS,
DREAMS, AND RELIGION, supra note 31, at 170.
52. Jung, Psychology and Religion, partially reprintedin THE ESSENTIAL JUNG
84 (A. Storr ed. 1983).
53. C. JUNG, supra note 44, at 50.
54. Campbell, Mythological Themes in Creative Art and Literature in MYTHS,
DREAMS AND RELIGION, supra note 31, at 157; cf. M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at
209-10 (myth is "produced" by the collective unconscious in the same way
that Madame Bovary was "produced" by adultery).
55. Jung, The Concept of the Collective Unconscious, in THE PORTABLE JUNG,
supra note 39, at 63, 64.
56. M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at 156; see id. at 147-48. Cf. Eliot, The
Wasteland, in T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTELAND AND OTHER POEMS 29 (1962). Eliot
begins, "April is the cruelest month, breeding / Lilacs out of the dead land,
mixing / Memory and desire, stirring / Dull roots with spring rain." Id. at 29.
He ends with three repetitions of "Shantih," id. at 46, which he translates as
"The Peace which passeth understanding," id. at 54. I am indebted to John
Robinson for suggesting this poem as a literary manifestation of the second
birth archetype.
57. Other archetypal images include the divine king or good shepherd,
-THE ESSENTIALJUNG, supra note 52, at 249; Wilder, Myth and Dream in Christian
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It is not inevitable, of course, that archetypal images be
religious, at least not in modern life.5 8 In religious societies,
however, archetypal images will typically be religious as well.
In a country like the United States, then, where public culture
has until recently been implicitly Protestant and where the vast
majority of the people still profess both belief in God and religious affiliations,5 9 it is not surprising that the most potent and
frequently manifested cultural symbols, those that satisfy the
demands of the collective unconscious, are religious. Because
the power of religious symbols derives in part from their link to
the archetypes in the unconscious mind, they are difficult, and
perhaps impossible, to discard even when one wishes to.
III.
Religious experience is holistic and compelling. The
imposition of secularism on religious people, then, carries with
it the danger of deep alienation, threatening either to marginalize religious belief or to provoke religious revolt against any
imposed secular order.
Originally, "secularization" meant merely the transfer of
legal title to ecclesiastical property to individuals and the state
for nonecclesiastical uses.6" As I have discussed, however, secularization in many circles of contemporary American life has
come to mean the total and mandatory exclusion of religious
influence from large and important spheres of American lifefrom public education, government, law and politics. 6 ' This is
the effect of twin causes-the privatization of religious belief
that forms part of the liberal tradition, and the abandonment of
faith in favor of reason that is the legacy of the Enlightenment.6 2 In a truly secular society, policies, arguments and
Scripture in MYTHS, DREAMS, AND RELIGION, supra note 31 at 75; the ascent to a
great height, M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at 128-29; the heroic figure, THE
ESSENTIAL JUNG, supra note 52, at 84; and the narrow passage or bridge to
another world, M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at 181-83.
58. For example, one explanation of the extraordinary influence of
Marxist thought over the last century is that it depicted archetypal images
that satisfy the needs of the collective unconscious in the same way that
religion does. See M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at 204-10; Fitch, Can There Be
Morality Without Religion?, in RELIGION, MORALITY, AND LAw 1, 3-4 (A. Harding

ed. 1956).
59. See supra note 5.
60. See H. KONG, ON
61.

BEING A CHRISTIAN

26-27 (1976).

See supra Part I. See generally Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 29, at

1581-85, 1612-13.
62. See generally A. LINDSAY, RELIGION, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN THE
MODERN WORLD 30 (1943); R. NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL
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claims that refer to religious belief for their validity are thought
inappropriate in public contexts, and are always subject to challenge solely because they are religiously based.6" Accordingly,
religious believers who wish to participate fully in secularized
spheres of public life feel pressure to cover and disguise religious motivations for the political claims they make if they wish
to be taken seriously. 6 4
The holism of religious belief, however, does not permit
an easy bifurcation of life into the sacred and the profane.
Consider Tillich's definition of "religion" as "ultimate concern," which I referred to earlier. This definition is familiar to
constitutional scholars; even the Supreme Court has relied on
it.65 Tillich himself, however, articulated a role for religious
belief that is not congenial to the separation of religion from
politics:
An ultimate concern must express itself socially. It cannot leave out any sphere of human existence. Intended
or not, it expresses itself in the most basic of cultural creations, in human language, and thence it permeates the
whole of life in a society.66
If religion is the state of being grasped by an ultimate
concern, this state cannot be restricted to a special realm.
supra note 16, at 270-73; R. SMITH,
179, 209 (1985); Frug, The
City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1074-75 (1980).
63. See R. NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 25; Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note
29, at 1597-98. One can understand the special disability that religion labors
under in contemporary political life by imagining whether a state legislature
constitutionally could prohibit a member of the Klu Klux Klan from holding
office, in service to its compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination.
The possibility that such a prohibition would be upheld by the Court is
remote. Yet, this is precisely what a plurality of the Court has suggested
might be constitutional with respect to a similar prohibition on ministers. See
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1978) (plurality opinion).
64. See R. NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 78. Kent Greenawalt has criticized
this phenomenon. K. GREENAWALT, supra note 9 (generally arguing that
religious convictions are properly relied on in the political process whenever
shared premises and publically accessible reasons do not yield determinate
answers). See also R. NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 125-26 (arguing that politics is
an "inescapably moral enterprise" and political actors should not have to
divest themselves of moral referents such as religious belief and experience).
Even Professor Greenawalt, however, believes that public dialogue should be
conducted in nonreligious terms. K. GREENAWALT, supra note 9, at ch. 12.
65. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); Seeger v. United
PROBLEMS

2 (1953); M.

TUSHNET,

LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See also Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of

Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978).
66. P. TILLICH, supra note 43, at 178.

434

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA It" ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4

The unconditional character of this concern implies that
it refers to every moment of our life, to every space and
every realm .... Essentially the religious and the secular
are not7 separated realms. Rather, they are within each
6
other.
Public secularization, then, is oppressive to the believer. It
requires that she divide and compartmentalize her life at the
same time that her religious experiences testify that life is an
indivisible and unified whole. For most religious people, this
compartmentalization is not only undesirable, but impossible.
Their religious beliefs and experiences are irretrievably entangled and interwoven with all of their "other" beliefs and experiences. 68 Compartmentalization essentially asks the religious
69
believer to approach her life as if she were not herself.
Thus, the exclusion of religiously based arguments from
politics excludes the most authentic part of a religious individual's personality from political life. The religious person cannot articulate as a basis for her public actions any of her
religious beliefs and experiences. 7 Unless she succeeds in disguising her religious motivations with secular arguments, or
abandons those motivations altogether, the political arena is,
for all practical purposes, closed to her. The knowledge that
conventional politics rejects an individual's religious beliefs
and experiences as irrelevant and even threatening to its business makes her feel separated, illegitimate, and inferior.
Even when the religious person succeeds in compartmentalizing her religious beliefs and experiences by disguising or
abandoning them in public contexts, to that extent she precipitates a new existential crisis. Religion constructs reality and
creates cosmological meaning for the believer; it is the necessary prerequisite to her being.7 ' To the religious person, to
67. Id. at 41.
68. See, e.g., K.

GREENAWALT,

supra note 9, at 150-51, 157-58, 179-80,

189; supra Part II.A.
69. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 9, at 155 ("To demand that many

devout Catholics, Protestants, and Jews pluck out their religious convictions
is to ask them how they would think about a critical moral problem if they

started from scratch, disregarding what they presently take as basic premises
of moral thought"); M. PERRY, supra note 9, at 182 ("To participate in politics
and law . . . with [one's moral or religious] convictions bracketed is not to
participate as the self that one is but as some one-or some thing-else.").
70. H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 16 (1974); R.
NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 81-82, 125; P. TILLICH, supra note 43, at 41-42.
71. See supra Part II; cf. M. BALL, supra note 4, at 182 n. 16 ("There can
be no knowledge of God apart from his revelation of himself.") (paraphrasing
Barth); S. HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER 45 (1981) ("There is no
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disguise one's religious beliefs is to disguise the meaning of
one's existence; abandonment of the sacred means abandonment of being itself.7 2
To the person whose religion demands integration of faith
with life, whose religious belief creates her sense of place in the
cosmos, abandoning the sacred in any portion of her life, even
superficially, creates oppressive tensions. These can be
relieved by abandoning one's faith, but this precipitates the
existential crisis in its most potent form.7 3 What one wants in
this circumstance is elimination of the tension between the
demands of secularism and those of religious belief, without
the feeling that one has abandoned the cosmic structure of
reality created by religious belief. One way to accomplish this
is to avoid asserting religiously based claims in public contexts,
and instead to conform the demands of religious belief to the
policy prescriptions of one or more secular-that is to say
"legitimate"-public agenda. Thus, one publicly mutes her
religion and agrees to a secular political agenda, not because
one's .religious beliefs demand the agenda or coincide with it,
but because agreement reduces feelings of dissonance and
alienation.7 ' Reverend Neuhaus has accused the mainline
Protestant churches of marginalizing themselves in precisely
way to talk about the social ethics of Christianity except as they are
determined by the form of Jesus's life.").
72. See M. PERRY, supra note 9, at 181-82 ("One's basic moral/religious
convictions are (partly) self-constitutive and are therefore a principal
ground-indeed, the principal ground-of political deliberation. To
"bracket" such convictions is therefore to bracket-to annihilate-essential
aspects of one's very self."); see also supra Part II.

73. M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at 100-13.
74. Under the theory of cognitive dissonance, a decisionmaker
experiences the cognitive effect of psychological pressure or dislocation"dissonance"-in part as the result of having made a decision which
contradicts reliable information. Cf. J. CAMPBELL, supra note 41, at 40-41
(visionaries, leaders, and heroes are always close to being neurotic, because
they attempt to act out private myths that do not coincide with social norms

and thereby live in a fearful world of uninterpreted "original experience").
Because most persons find it easier to maintain a self-image that is more or
less consistent with their perception of the social environment in which they
live, a common human response to dissonance is to seek to reduce or to

eliminate it. Dissonance theory suggests that following a decision to become
or to remain committed to a religious tradition, believers will experience
dissonance stemming from the secularism that pervades American public life
and contrasts sharply with their religious faith. The theory further suggests
that believers will attempt to eliminate the dissonance-for example, by
pursuing strategies such as those described in the text. For an overview of
cognitive dissonance theory, see M. DEUTSCH & R. KRAUSS, THEORIES IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

62-76 (1965). For a creative and provocative application
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this way by essentially aligning themselves with the left wing of
the Democratic Party. 7 5 One might also characterize the religious right as having done the same thing with respect to the
Republican Party, although it is probably more accurate to
describe that party as76 having bent to the fundamentalists,
rather than vice versa.
Eventually, acquiescing to its privatization and saying little
to distinguish itself from secular interest groups, religion
becomes tamed and domesticated. 7 Such religion is neutered.
It does not pervade the lives of its believers, and is not likely to
call them to action. 78 Ultimately, it is distinguishable from secularism only by decorative trimmings of prayer and piety at the
edges of fundamentally secular public policy arguments. 7 9 Yet,
domesticated religion preserves institutional forms of worship
and belief, so that the existential crisis is avoided. As Professor
Ball has eloquently described, this kind of religion is laced with
irony, ministering to the spiritual needs of the suffering at the
same time that it legitimates the exercises of power that cause
the suffering. 80
Many religious Americans have chosen not to circumscribe
and dilute their religious beliefs as the means of dealing with
of dissonance theory to constitutional interpretation, see Blumoff, The Third
Best Choice: An Essay in Law and History, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 537 (1990).
75. See generally R. NEUHAUS, supra note 2, ch. 3.
76. Cf. infra note 89.

77. Cf. H. BERMAN, supra note 70, at 95-96 (privatized religion leaves
Christianity with "little to say other than what the world wants to hear"); M.
TUSHNET,

supra note 16, at ch. 8 (Supreme Court doctrine protects the free

exercise of religion only to the extent that (i) the religious practice in
question can be reduced to a protected secular constitutional right, or (ii)
such protection encroaches only marginally on the goals and interests of
secular society).
78. Cf R. BELLAH, supra note 41, at 45-49 (civil religion would have
been ineffective in creating nineteenth century American consciousness of
individual freedom and autonomy without parallel reinforcement by

Protestant revivalism).
79. For example, compare the influential pastoral letters of the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops on the arms race and economic
injustice, THE
(May 3, 1983);

CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE
ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETrER ON CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (Nov. 18, 1986), with the pious and
ineffectual "God and country" rhetoric of Ronald Reagan. Cf. M. ELIADE,

supra note 32, at 152-55 (describing how religion "can be rarefied and
transformed until it becomes a purely human emotion."). Even the pastoral

letters have been criticized for having been too cognizant of secular agenda.
See, e.g., S. HAUERWAS, AGAINST THE NATIONS 15-16 (1985).
80.

Ball, Normal Religion in America, 4

POL'y 397, 399 (1990).
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the secularization of public life. On the contrary, many seem to
defy that secularization, at least in certain spheres of public life.
The School Prayer Cases remain controversial despite the passage
of time.8 While most Americans support the general principle
of church-state separation, large numbers dissent from the
rigor with which the Supreme Court has applied the principle. 82 The re-emergence of religious fundamentalism in politics has brought with it declarations of religious meaning not
just for believers, but for everybody, believer or not.8 3 Liberation theology places the religious left squarely in the middle of
debates on American foreign policy in Central America and
elsewhere. Roman Catholics, conservative Protestants, and
Mormons continue to inject themselves individually and institutionally into abortion politics.
It is not enough that the Supreme Court in its wisdom has
determined that secularism in certain areas of public life, such
as public schools, is constitutionally required. Such unilateral
declarations by the Court only heighten the potential for alienation by suggesting that secularism is being imposed by an
unelected elite that is far from a political majority.8" American
81. In 1983, more than 20 years after the Supreme Court held in
successive cases that prayer in the public schools violated the establishment
clause, one study found that 80% of the general population thought that
prayer in the public schools should be permitted, and only 10% supported
the Court's holdings. See H. MCCLOSKY & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF
TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS THINK ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 133 (1983).
82. Id. at 133-34.
83. A believer who is both faithful to her own tradition and sensitive to
the diversity of belief in the United States might preface religiously based
policy arguments with something like, "For Catholics . .. " or "If one is
Christian ...... The religious right articulates no such premise. Though it
interprets history and current events by the idiosyncratic light of its own
fundamentalist lamp, it nevertheless insists that its interpretations are valid
and controlling for everyone. Cf R. NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 133 (religious
new right is making public claims based on private truths).
84. It has been widely observed that secularism is an elite taste that
seems to be shared by intellectuals in particular. The clearest description of
this phenomenon belongs to James Boyd White:
[There is] a peculiar division between academic and religious
thought in our culture. In the academic world, we tend to speak as
though all participants in our conversation were purely rational
actors engaged in rational debate; perhaps some people out there in
the world are sufficiently benighted that they turn to religious beliefs
or other superstitions, but that is not true of us or, if it is true, we
hide it, and it ought not to be true of them. Ours is a secular
academy and, we think, a secular state.
White, Response to Roger Cramton'sArticle, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 533, 533 (1987).
See also K. GREENAWALT, supra note 9, at 6 ("A good many professors and
other intellectuals display a hostility or skeptical indifference to religion that
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democracy is critically dependent on the support of its people
for the underlying political system. In large part, the stability
of that system depends on the perception that it respects popular culture. Governments that do not respect culture are eventually forced into oppression to avoid their overthrow.8 5 If the
large number of Americans committed to religious belief and
experience come to believe, as many of them already do, that
the political system does not respect their way of life to the
same extent it respects secular lifestyles, then they themselves
will tend not to respect that system or the government and laws
that it generates. When large numbers of religious Americans
no longer feel that they have a stake in the political system,
conditions will be ripe for revolution.
Thus, the secularization of public life, if it does not trivialize religion, may result in its rebellion. Jung has suggested
that revolution under these conditions-that is, to preserve the
meaning that is poured into the psychological demands of the
collective unconscious-is especially violent and uncontrolled.8 6 The last decade has vividly illustrated that, even in
the absence of outright violence, large numbers of disaffected
believers bring to politics a rigid and strident persecution comamounts to a thinly disguised contempt for belief in any reality beyond that
discoverable by scientific inquiry and ordinary human experience."); A.
REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 360 (1985) (noting- the continued private religiosity of Americans despite "recent incursions by civil
humanism among cultural elites and relentless promotion of egoism by
advertising and entertainment media"); Edmundson, A Will to Cultural Power:
Deconstructing the DeMan Scandal, HARPERS MAG., July 1988, at 67, 69-70

(observing that by the 1960s, English literature professors at elite universities
believed that literature had supplanted religion as the principal source of
moral values).
85. Cf. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 133 ("power that is exercised in
contradiction to culture is very fragile. It depends overwhelmingly,
sometimes exclusively, on coercion"); P. TILLICH, supra note 43, at 138
("External imposition is not sufficient for creation of a moral system ...

Only a system which is internalized is safe"); Karst, Paths to Belonging: The
Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REV. 303, 369 (1986) ("a society
can[not] maintain its 'unifying ideology' . . . unless the society's system of

beliefs is largely validated in most people's minds by their own experience").
The activities of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines and Poland
are examples of the ability of the church to challenge effectively the power of
authoritarian and even totalitarian regimes. The rise to power of
fundamentalist Islamic clerics in Iran may be an example of what happens
when one attempts to suppress and secularize an indigenous religion, as the
Shah attempted to do.
86. C. JUNG, supra note 44, at 50.
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a system premised on accommodation
plex that destabilizes
87
and compromise.

IV.

I have argued that insisting on privatized religion and secularized politics tends toward desacralization, on the one hand,
or revolution, on the other. Neither is a happy consequence.
Though the elimination of religion would no doubt be celebrated by some, it would deprive a great many in the United
States of the reference point by which they define themselves,
at the same time that it would deprive society of the many
socially valuable functions that religious institutions perform.
Most important, with the elimination of such a large group of
institutions that mediate between government and individuals
would come increased vulnerability to state domination.8 8
The alternatives of desacralization and revolution, are
forced upon us by the metaphor of the "wall of separation" and
the oppositional dualism of secular versus religious that frame
analysis of the relation of religion and politics. One way to
avoid these consequences, then, is to discard both the metaphor and the dualism.8 9 Rather than talking about "religion
and politics," as if they encompassed wholly separate realms,
we should reemphasize that religion, together with other actors
and influences, is constitutive of politics.
Argument, as Professor Ball has elsewhere written, is ultimately a communal act: "When we engage in argument, persuading and being persuaded, we practice mutual dignity. The
other person must be convinced; the other deserves to be con87. Cf.R. NIEBUHR, supra note 62, at 23 ("we have seen how limited is
the power of law whenever a portion of the community adheres to moral
standards which differ from those of the total community," citing as examples
dissenters from Prohibition and advocates for black civil rights).
88. I have explored these themes at length in Gedicks, Toward a
ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99.
89. The abandonment of separationism in the United States may
already be under way. Historically, American culture has blunted the force of
revolutionary movements by co-opting their essential elements-witness the
neutralization of socialism by Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal. During
the last decade, the Republican Party has embraced much of the agenda and
virtually all of the rhetoric of the religious right, thereby diluting some of the
fervor (and alienation) of that movement. The result, however, has been
more religion and more power for religious people within the structure of the
party. One might argue that the Democratic Party must make a similar move
if it is ever to win another national election.
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vinced." 9 The "wall of separation" must be breached at least
to the extent of allowing religion qua religion to enter into the
conversations about important issues that are carried on in
political life. In this way religion is recognized as having something to say that other participants in public life should at least
consider in their deliberations. The knowledge that their voice
is being heard-acknowledged as worthy of being listened to,
even if not agreed with-greatly reduces the alienation that the
demand of a secularized politics otherwise threatens to produce. Knowing that the political system hears and values their
views, religious people regain a stake in participating in that
system.
The replacement metaphor I would propose in this area of
church-state relations, then, is the metaphor of conversation. 9
The ideal relation between religion and politics is one that
ensures that all voices-religious and secular-are heard in a
context of seriousness and respect. Perhaps, then, the metaphor is more accurately labelled "civil" or even "courteous"
conversation.
There are at least two difficulties with a "civil conversation" metaphor for religion and politics: One is a problem of
language, and the other a problem of trust.
A.
Let me take up first the language problem. Before the secular and the religious can converse, they require a common
language, and this America does not have. 92 Americans share a
common tongue, more or less, but by "language" I mean more
than that. Language is culture, and in translating from one culture to another, meaning is lost. As things stand now, religious
concepts spoken in public contexts must be referenced to secular culture-that is, spoken in its language. Religious belief
and experience, however, do not easily translate into secular
language,9" and often are simply alien to a humanistic world
90. M. BALL, supra note 4, at 42. See also id. at 45; R. NEUHAUS, supra
note 2, at 112.
91. Cf. M. BALL, supra note 4 (arguing for a metaphorical conception of

law as "medium" rather than "bulwark"). For an argument that moral
dialogue in a morally pluralistic society is both possible and worthwhile, see
M. PERRY supra note 9, ch. 2.
92. Some have suggested the quasi-religious language of civil religion.
See, e.g., Note, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237
(1986). This I believe to be little better than the language of secularism. Cf.
supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
93. What, for example, is the secular equivalent of "Christian faith?"
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view that is highly influenced by perceptions of objectivity and
reason.9 4 What is needed is a language that is respectful of
religious premises, but is still understandable by secular
culture. 9 5
I have two suggestions on how this language might be
developed. The first has been extensively treated by others
and need not detain us long.9 6 As a variety of organizations
have suggested for many years, 97 religion should be reintroCf. P. TILLICH, supra note 43, at 56 (religious symbols "open up levels of
reality that otherwise are hidden and cannot be grasped in any other way");
accord M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at 13. See alsoJ. CAMPBELL, supra note 41, at
49 ("The best things can't be told because they transcend thought.").
94. M. ELIADE, supra note 32, at 8-9.
95. An interesting statement of the problem is contained in a passage
from Nikos Kazantzakis's novel, THE LAST TEMPTATION OF CHRIST. The
passage is based on the New Testament story of Jesus's healing of a Roman
centurion's servant. This story recounts how the centurion sought out Jesus
and asked him to heal a beloved and mortally afflicted servant. Jesus
performed the miracle, and the servant recovered. In his novel, Kazantzakis
portrays Jesus and the centurion as having had a subsequent encounter.
After reiterating his sincere gratitude to Jesus, the centurion finds that he has
little else to say. Like most Romans, he despises the Jews as uncultured and
uncivilized; he is baffled that someone as powerful and intelligent as Jesus
would spend time with them:
"How can you talk to this pack of dogs?" the centurion asked.
Jesus blushed. "They are not dogs," he said, "but souls, sparks
of God. God is a conflagration, centurion, and each soul a spark to
be revered by you."
"I am a Roman," answered [the centurion], "and my God is a
Roman. He opens roads, builds barracks, brings water to cities,
arms himself in bronze and goes to war. He leads, we follow. The
body and soul you talk of are one and the same to us, and above
them is the seal of Rome. When we die both soul and body die
together-but our sons remain. That is what we mean by
immortality. I'm sorry, but what you say about the kingdoms of
heaven seems just a fairy tale to us."
After a pause, he continued: "We Romans are made to govern
men, and men are not governed by love."
"Love is not unarmed," said Jesus.
"Love too makes war
and runs to the assault."
"It isn't love, then," said the centurion.
Jesus lowered his head. I must find new wineskins, he reflected,
if I'm to pour in new wine. New wineskins, new words ...

N.

KAZANTZAKIS, THE LAST TEMPTATION OF CHRIST

380 (1960).

96. See, e.g., Dent, Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
864 (1988); Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secular
Humanism in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177.
97. In the wake of Paul Vitz's important study demonstrating the
determinedly secular, almost anti-religious bias of public school textbooks, P.
VITZ, supra note 7, several non-sectarian groups, notably the Carnegie
Institute (through what has become known as the Williamsburg Charter) and
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duced into the public school curriculum as a subject of academic study. Religion has been one of the dominant influences
in the development of Western civilization, and it continues to
be important in American and world affairs. Failing to teach
about religion both in history and in contemporary society is
simply a failure of public education. Indeed, one of the reasons
why the assertion of religious premises in public seems strange
and inappropriate is that since World War II American public
school students have stopped learning about religion as something relevant to things past or present.9 8
A second suggestion is illustrated by the holding of a
recent Supreme Court case, Bowen v. Kendrick.9 9 In Bowen, the
Court considered the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family
Life Act, which permitted religious organizations, among other
social service groups, to receive funds for services and research
relating to adolescent pregnancy and sex. The Court held that
the Act did not facially violate the establishment clause.
Pregnancy and sexual activity among teenagers are widely
recognized as serious national problems, if not crises. If we are
agreed that teen promiscuity in general and teen-aged parents
the California State Board of Education, as well as the American Association
of School Administrators, the American Federation of Teachers, the
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, the National
Council for the Social Studies, the National Education Association, and the
National School Boards Associations, have advocated that public schools
begin explicitly to teach American and world religious history and sociology.
See generally Anderson, Coalition Produces Guidelines on Religion and Public Schools,
June 10, 1988 (UPI wire story filed on NEXIS).
98. Vitz's principal finding was that public school textbooks ignore
religion. P. VITZ, supra note 7, at 21-22, 70. For example, the textbooks that
he surveyed generally failed to discuss the Protestant Reformation, the
founding and development of Mormonism, Christian Science, Seventh Day
Adventism, or other distinctly American religions, the influence of
conservative Protestantism in American history, or the positive contributions
of Catholicism andJudaism to American social reform movements. Id. at 32,
42, 65. In certain books, Vitz found that the authors went to considerable
effort to describe religious events in secular terms. See, e.g., id. at 24-25
(describing textbooks which discuss pilgrims as "people who make long
trips" without reference to religious character or motivation); id. at 44
(describing textbooks which discuss Joan of Arc without any reference to
God, revelation, Catholicism, or sainthood). Vitz also found evidence of
cultural censorship. See, e.g., id. at 4 1-42 (describing textbooks which devote
substantial discussion to Mohammed and the rise of Islam while giving little
or no treatment to Jesus and Christianity). In fact, Vitz concluded that
textbooks were most likely to discuss religions that were chronologically,
culturally, or geographically remote from contemporary American life. Id. at
23-25. 33-36.
99. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
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in particular are not good things, there are a variety of ways of
attempting to help teenagers avoid the risks of early sexual
activity and pregnancy-for example, by providing better sex
education, wider distribution of contraceptives, and cheaper
and more accessible abortion procedures.' 0 0 There are also a
variety of ways to dissuade teenagers from engaging in (at
least) indiscriminate sex, primarily by teaching that they are
unprepared in a variety of ways to undertake the psychological,
social, financial and other difficulties and commitments that are
normally associated with sexual activity, child-bearing, and
parenting. Religious and secular approaches both can be effective in communicating this.
Nevertheless, these dissuasion techniques suffer from the
infirmity common to all attempts to teach moral behavior without reference to a definitive moral standard: they appeal principally to self-interest. The hope is that teenagers will be
persuaded that it is simply not prudent to have children or to
be sexually active at their age. This approach is consistent with
the liberal conception of the autonomous individual, which
frames constitutional analysis even when the individuals are
children.'' Under liberalism, an individual is assumed to have
an interest in satisfying her preferences, wants, and desires,
whatever they might be. As an autonomous individual, the
teenager who is unpersuaded by prudential argument about
abstinence has an interest-one that government is bound to
respect-in being sexually active, and bearing and raising
children.
Appeals to self-interest that run counter to one's preferences, wants, or desires are not always very effective in teaching
morality, particularly when dealing with adolescents. It
requires considerable wisdom and maturity to project the consequences of a decision about sexual activity or pregnancy into
the future and forego immediate gratification of wants and
desires, and adolescents are not well known for either quality.' 0 2 Indeed, a general assumption that interests and prefer100. A recent study, however, concluded that education alone is
ineffective in deterring sexual activity among teenagers. See Coleman,
Classroom Sex Ed Alone Has Little Impact on Teen Sex Behavior, Mar. 2, 1989
(Associated Press wire story filed on NEXIS).
101. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976). See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983); H.L. v. Matheson. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
102. For examples of adolescent naivete about sex, child-bearing, and
parenting, see Marek, The Lives of Teenage Mothers, HARPERS MAc., Apr. 1989,
at 56. See also Note, supra note 29, at 453-59.
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ences coincide gives the adolescent no reason to forego
immediate gratification.
By contrast, under nonliberal premises merely to have a
preference, want, or desire does not necessarily mean that one
has an interest in satisfying it; under some "naturalist"
approaches to moral knowledge, for example, one has an interest in satisfying only those preferences, wants, and desires that
lead to one's "flourishing"-i.e., living the most satisfying life
of which she is capable, given the religious or other moral narratives or traditions to which she subscribes.'0 3 Placing a moral
principle within the context of a religious or other moral narrative enables one to teach more powerfully-to teach for example, that adolescent pregnancy is wrong,'1 4 notjust ill-advised.
A recent panel discussion at the University of Michigan
Law School on religion in public schools illustrates my point.
One panelist stated his difficulty with a schoolteacher's identifying behavior as "immoral" rather than "inappropriate." A
rabbi on the panel characterized this difficulty as "an inability
to take a moral stand."' 0 5 Placing a moral principle in a narrative context, religious or otherwise,1 6 can give the principle a
compellingness and force that dwarfs mere appeals to personal
expediency.' 0 7 At a minimum, such a context enriches and
deepens the whole idea of self-interest by informing one's concepts of both self and morality.
The Bowen Court's rejection of the facial attack on the Adolescent Family Life Act, then, was wise, though not for the reasons it articulated. The Court reasoned that the establishment
clause was not violated so long as the religious groups receiving aid under the Act are not "pervasively sectarian" and do
not use the aid for "pervasively sectarian" purposes.'0 8 I think
this is wrong-headed; the search should be for coercion and
103.

See M. PERRY, supra note 9, at 10-20.

104. Moral judgment of this type can take either a foundationalist or a
relativist form-i.e., judging conduct to be wrong for all adolescents, or
wrong for particular adolescents, depending on their self-concept and other
personal factors. See generally M. PERRY, supra note 9, at 25, 44.
105. Tackling Difficult Issues: Panel Discusses Religion and the Public Schools,
LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES, Fall 1988, at 10-11.
106. Obviously, religious contexts and traditions are not the only ones
available for effective or moral teaching. See, e.g., Hirshman, Bronte, Bloom, and

Bork: An Essay on the Moral Education ofJudges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177 (1988).
Moreover, a naturalist approach to moral knowledge need not be religious,
though many are. See generally M. PERRY, supra note 9, at 21-22.
107. R. NEuHAus, supra note 2, at 76. See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S.
Ct. 2562, 2567 (1988); M. PERRY, supra note 9, at 21-22.
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deception, not for religion, which is bound to be present in any
effective program of teenage pregnancy counselling offered by
a religious organization. The significance of the "sectarian"
incidents recounted by the dissent' 0 9 was not that they demonstrated the "pervasive" religiosity of certain sponsors, but
rather that children who received services from these sponsors
may have been pressured or deceived into taking an action contrary to their personal religious beliefs. Only Justices Kennedy
and Scalia seemed to have any sense of this. ' 10 Both the majority and the dissent asked and answered the wrong question.
Government, if it chooses, should be able financially to
assist religious groups as part of a general program when their
religious teachings are consistent with the policy goals of the
program, so long as the religious groups that receive the aid do
not use it to coerce anyone's religious beliefs, or deceive anyone about the groups' religious premises."' So long as coercion and deception are not present, it would seem that a child
who is thought sufficiently mature by the law to choose to have
sex, bear a child, and become a parent is similarly capable of
voluntarily deciding that her interests are best served by seeking counselling about such matters from a religious-even
"pervasively sectarian'"-organization."t 2 Moreover, the consistent interaction of government and religion in a public context like the Act will help to develop a public culture in which
religion is acknowledged and respected as having a role to play
in addressing and solving difficult issues of public policy.
B.
Although the Court refused to strike down the Adolescent
Family Life Act on its face, it left open the possibility that it
could be invalidated "as applied" by remanding the case for
further development of the factual record on the question
whether any recipients of aid under the Act are "pervasively
sectarian."l3 Regardless of how this particular inquiry turns
out, it is probably safe to assume that some religious recipients
109. Id. at 2585-87.
110. See id. at 2582 (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that once a spending statute has survived a facial challenge under
the establishment clause, the issue is not whether a particular institution
receiving funds is "pervasively sectarian," but rather whether the institution
spends the funds to advance religion).
11.
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. &
MARY

L.

112.

REV.

933 (1986).

See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.

113. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2579-81.
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under the Act were not satisfied with receiving assistance to
counsel only those who made an informed choice to listen to
them. There is a real danger that some religious groups may
use the wedge of recognition and assistance provided to them
by the Act to proselytize and coerce religious belief among
adolescents who do not share (and do not wish to consider) the
groups' religious premises.
This brings me to the problem of trust. I have argued that
it is oppressive and dangerous to seek to establish and maintain
a purely secular polity in the United States. It would be at least
as oppressive, and perhaps more dangerous, to establish and
maintain a purely religious polity-a theocracy. If religious
people and organizations ought to be able to participate fully in
American public life without shedding their religious identity,
then they ought also to exercise caution and sensitivity in positions of public influence so as not to use those positions to stifle and harass the voices of those who disagree with them, even
when those voices belong (God forbid!) to "secular
humanists".
Unfortunately, many religious individuals and groups have
shown little inclination to caution or sensitivity in public interactions with those of differing views. Many religious groups,
especially fundamentalist ones, seem to have forgotten that
contemporary models of institutional religion were significantly
shaped by the humanistic influences of the Renaissance, the
Reformation, and the Enlightenment." 4 They are not troubled
by the thought that public life should be dominated by a single
world-view; they are troubled only that a view other than their
own is doing the dominating. Apparently, they do not believe
it is wrong for one construction of reality to force out all
others, so long as the victorious reality is the particular one
they espouse. Thus, they assent to the monistic model of public life assumed by strict separationists;' '5 they disagree only in
asserting the sacred rather than the profane as the exclusive,
participational prerequisite.
Consider the recent controversy over Martin Scorsese's
film, The Last Temptation of Christ. Taking seriously the Christian
belief that Jesus was man and God, Scorsese sought to portray
the human as well as the divine Jesus. Given the traditional
114. See H. KiJNG, supra note 60, at 26-31. One might hope-perhaps
in vain-that not even conservative churches wish to return to the medieval
Roman church (or to Calvin or even Winthrop, for that matter) as the model
for contemporary church polity.
115. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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Christian emphasis on Jesus's divine nature, Scorsese chose to
highlight his human nature. Against the backdrop of divine
myth, the placement of human attributes like cowardice, vulgarity and lust in the life ofJesus-even though only as temptations-seemed jarring and blasphemous to many Christians.
The source of the controversy surrounding The Last Temptation, then, was the converse of that surrounding a secularized
politics. In contrast to a secularized politics, which requires
that religious people disguise or abandon their religious beliefs
or experiences when making public arguments, Scorsese's
movie was attacked by religious groups precisely because it
abandoned, or at least radically reinterpreted, the conventional
religious myth ofJesus. In the view of these groups, one must
talk about Jesus in the traditional language of the sacred, or
one cannot be permitted to talk about him at all.
If transcending the dualism of secular versus religious
requires that religion qua religion be accorded a legitimate
place in public life, one must also acknowledge the risk that this
entails. With this kind of public recognition and legitimation,
religion may not merely pluralize public life, but may attempt
to sacralize it, by casting secularism out of the political temple
and replacing it with sectarianism. In a time when the news
remains filled with stories of religious leaders encouraging and
committing violence to achieve religious goals," 16 the risk that
secular domination of the public square could be replaced with
religious domination is not one lightly to be dismissed. On this
issue, many religious groups simply are not worthy of trust.
V.
In a somewhat different context, Gerald Frug has suggested that the political choices we face are never clearly
drawn. One can only attempt to determine which of many
threats to liberty is the most likely and the most dangerous, and
choose to resist that threat, knowing that the others still
remain.' 17 In considering the question of religion in politics, I
116. I refer here not only to the threats on Salmon Rushdie's life by
Islamic fundamentalists, see A "'Satanic"Fury, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1989, at 34;
Hunted by An Angry Faith, TIME, Feb. 27, 1989, at 28, but also to the periodic
calls by fundamentalist American Protestants for God to "strike down" those
Justices who continue to support abortion rights, see, e.g., Don't Pray for Us,
NAT'L L.J.,June 16, 1986, at 14, col. 1. See also Epstein, Divided Supreme Court
to Hear Crucial Case on Abortion, Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Apr. 22, 1989, at
A- 12, col. 1; Roe v. Wade's Author Revered and Reviled, PA. L. J.-REP., June 16,
1986, at 9, col. 1.
117. Frug writes:
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believe that abandoning the religious-secular dualism and
replacing the separation metaphor, and thereby seeking to
eliminate the alternative threats of religious marginalism and
revolt, are worth the risk that religion may co-opt the secular in
public life. But I do not hold this belief with confidence. Perhaps our efforts are better directed at managing the alienation
caused by a secular politics than at attempting to pluralize that
politics. This suggests a third way in which religious people
can react to public secularism, besides marginalizing their religion or rebelling against the secular order: they can simply
"put up" with it as the best available alternative.'1 8
Managing religious alienation as an unavoidable cost of
maintaining the best possible alternative suggests an expansive
and sensitive view of free exercise, so as to keep alienation to a
minimum. The Court and many commentators, however, have
lately relied on readings of the free exercise clause that are anything but expansive and sensitive. Decisions like Lyng, 1 9 with
its blithe judgment that desecration of a native American burial
ground and destruction of tribal religious culture are acceptable costs of harvesting federal timber, 120 can only increase reliIn supporting the need for decentralized power, one should not
make the mistake of denying the force of the liberal attack against it.
Independent corporate power of any kind does threaten
individuals ....
Our choice, then, whether or not to have strong
intermediate bodies is not a choice between vulnerability and
protection. The exercise of state power infringes individual rights
protected by independent corporations, yet the exercise of
corporate power infringes individual rights protected by the state.
Every time we seek state help to protect us from a corporate
invasion of our rights, we strengthen one threat to liberty at the
expense of another; yet every time we prevent the state from
protecting us against corporate power, we accomplish the same
result. Our only option is to choose which danger to liberty seems
more tolerable, more controllable, or more worth defending.
Frug, supra note 62, at 1123-24.
118. Cf Faith in the Republic: A Frances Lewis Law Center Conversation
(Colloquium), 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 482 (1988) (remarks of Professor
Tushnet) (suggesting that, within the liberal tradition, majoritarianism
restrained by culture may be "the best we can do"); see also id. at 523
(exchange between Professor Tushnet and Sanford Levinson) (discussing
whether the pro-slavery 1787 constitutional document may be morally
defensible as the best that could have been written at that point in American
history).
119. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct.
1319 (1988).
120. In Lyng, the Court rejected a free exercise challenge to a Forest
Service road construction plan to facilitate timber harvests on federally
owned land that included a traditional native American burial site. Id. at
1321-23. Although the Court acknowledged that implementation of the plan
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gious alienation and the accompanying risks of religious
marginalism or revolt.' 2 1 Similarly, eliminating -religiously
based exemptions under the free exercise clause, a position
being argued by an increasing number of commentators,' 22 will
build and strengthen religious alienation.
In any event, Americans ought to pause before claiming
the separation of religion and politics as a success of American
democracy. In a country that purports to value autonomy and
freedom, the "wall of separation" is an ironic solution to the

problem of religion in politics-a metaphor of political failure,
not success.

"will have severe adverse effects on the practice of [the native American]
religion" and "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious
practices . . . intimately and inextricably bound up with the unique features"
of the land subject to the plan, it nevertheless held that since the plan did not
actually "coerce individuals into acting contrary to their beliefs," the
government was under no obligation to present a compelling justification for
building the road. Id. at 1324, 1326.
121. See also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (refusing to
create free exercise exemption for orthodox Jewish military officer to wear
yarmulke in violation of military regulations).
122.

See, e.g., Kamenshine, supra note 26; Marshall, Solving the Free

Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983);
Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO.
L.J. 1691 (1988); West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v (1990); W. Marshall, The Case
Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption (1989)
(unpublished paper delivered at Georgetown University Law Center).

